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Abstract
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In markets where not only price (a monetary dimension) but also quality (a non-
monetary dimension) matters, pure price regulation, in general, does not yield overall
desirable outcomes (see, for instance, Armstrong and Sappington [3] and Sappington [30]).
Speciﬁcally, when ﬁrms are compelled to obey a price cap, they are induced to cut
costs, which may translate into quality under-provision. This issue regards potentially all
network industries in which a price cap is adopted. With reference to telecommunications,
Vogelsang [32] observes that concerns about quality deterioration are widespread and that,
indeed, such services are subject to price-cap regulation in most OECD countries and in
several others. In fact, Rovizzi and Thompson [29] report that after privatization, a
noticeable quality reduction was registered in British Telecom’s services as soon as the
company was submitted to a price cap. According to Crew and Parker [17], among the
various quality aspects that might suﬀer from price ceiling, most penalized seems to be
service reliability, which is a crucial part of service value to end users.1
De Fraja and Iozzi [19] look for a way to use a price cap in environments with relevant
quality aspects, under the motivation that:
"Price-cap regulation (...) strikes a very good compromise between the
theoretically rigorous foundation of the theory of optimal regulation (...) and
the practitioner’s requirement of the simple, easy-to-understand, easy-to-apply
rule."
They integrate quality dimensions into the "standard" price cap, restructuring the
latter as a price-and-quality cap. Characterizing the ideal composition of this incentive
scheme with regard to multi-product monopolies, they ﬁnd two essential results. The ﬁrst
result is that, in the index that enters the formula, the appropriate weights of the diﬀerent
prices are (proportional to) the optimal quantities of the products sold by the regulated
ﬁrm. In other words, this cap does not diﬀer from the "standard" price cap, where quality
is not an issue2 (Brennan [12]; Laﬀont and Tirole [24]). The second result in De Fraja
and Iozzi [19] is that quality weights in the "extended" cap should be equal to consumer
marginal surplus evaluated at the optimal prices and qualities. Billette de Villemeur [8]
obtains similar ﬁndings with reference to monopolistic airline industries, where relevant
dimensions are price and service frequency.3
1Service reliability introduces an element of heterogeneity even in electricity, a product that is otherwise
perfectly homogeneous. Speciﬁcally, in power sectors, reaction lags and supply interruptions are relevant
quality dimensions (compare Crampes and Moreaux [14]).
2A standard price cap may ﬁnd speciﬁcations according to the context. For instance, Billette de
Villemeur, Cremer, Roy and Toledano [9] characterize a price-cap scheme that ﬁts postal sector features.
3Under a monopoly (though not necessarily in other frameworks), service frequency is equivalent to a
pure quality attribute.
2These ﬁndings do not need to extend to vertically diﬀerentiated oligopolies in which
regulation concerns one sole ﬁrm. With regard to non-monopolistic sectors, it is known
that if a regulated incumbent competes with an unregulated passive fringe, then total
market quantities are the optimal weights in the pure price cap only if fringe proﬁts
are not included in social welfare. By contrast, if fringe proﬁts are taken to contribute
to social welfare, then appropriate weights relate to the optimal quantities of the sole
regulated ﬁrm. These results are found by Brennan [12], who further acknowledges that
when competitors are not price-takers, a diﬀerent recipe is required. Yet, the author does
not formally provide such a recipe, even just for a pure price cap.
In the present article, we provide theoretical foundations to the price-and-quality cap
regulation4 of oligopolies where a regulated incumbent competes in price and quality with
one (or few) strategic rival(s), who operate(s) unregulated. By doing so, we extend the
literature about price-and-quality regulati o nt h r o u g hc a ps c h e m e sw h i c hh a sf o c u s e do n
monopolistic markets so far, to oligopolistic settings as well.
The framework we consider, namely an oligopoly where the sole incumbent is regulated,
closely reﬂects the most common outcome of the liberalization process recently undergone
by many industries that were previously fully regulated. Typically, in those sectors, the
former monopolist is subject to regulatory control, whereas the (few) competitors that
have entered after liberalization operate unregulated, despite exerting market power in
order to gain proﬁts. Our model is meant to stylize concentrated and partially regulated
industries of this sort. For example, one may think about competition between regu-
lated telephone companies and unregulated cable voice-over-Internet-Protocol, or wireless
cellular companies in voice telephony. One may further consider competition between
the regulated and unregulated cable television services. Actually, the model may equally
well represent competition across asymmetrically regulated industries. One instance is
inter-modal competition between regulated train companies and deregulated air carriers
in European transport industries.
To capture the relevance of quality provision and motivate quality regulation, we repre-
sent a market where vertically diﬀerentiated services are supplied to consumers exhibiting
heterogeneous quality valuations. Our choice to model vertical (rather than horizontal)
diﬀerentiation follows from the observation that in the industrial contexts we refer to, con-
sumers tend to share the same quality ranking, e.g., they perceive the product provided
by the incumbent as superior to the product(s) oﬀered by the competitor(s). For instance,
in voice telephony, the services provided by telephone companies are generally more reli-
able than those provided by cable companies. Similarly, most of the time, air transport
is considered to be more comfortable and reliable than rail transport. In turn, regulated
cable television services typically broadcast higher quality programes and propose less
advertising than unregulated competitors.
Importantly, for quality to be regulated, it must be both observable and veriﬁable. This
4The eﬀects of price ceilings on service quality has already been investigated both theoretically and
empirically (see, for instance, Sappington [31] and Weisman [34]).
3is actually the case in nearly all network industries. It is indeed possible to observe and
collect data about connection interruptions in voice telephony, advertising frequency and
program content in cable TV services, travel time and departure/arrival delays in trans-
port services. This is why, in network industries, as the literature has pointed out, service
quality is often heavily regulated, whereas infrastructure quality, which is hardly observ-
able and veriﬁable, in general remains unregulated (see Martimort and Sand-Zantman
[27], for instance). As observed by a referee, data collection can be expensive. However,
real-world practice seems to suggest that it is worth its cost.5
Furthermore, it is frequently the case that the quality of the goods and/or services
the utilities provide (though not the inner quality of the network infrastructures) can be
adjusted in the short run. To reﬂect this circumstance, in our model we take quality to
be as ﬂexible as price. Yet, we also discuss the consequences of quality being a longer-run
decision variable.6
We begin by characterizing the optimal price-and-quality pair to be decentralized by
the regulator. In the presence of strategic rivals that remain unregulated, the relevant
benchmark is given by the equilibrium price-and-quality pair of a market game in which a
welfare-maximizing ﬁrm competes with one (or more) proﬁt-maximizing rival(s), under the
requirement that its proﬁt be non-negative. From this perspective, our work is reminiscent
of the mixed oligopoly models in which a public ﬁrm competes with one (or more) pri-
vate operator(s) under the break-even constraint.7 We characterize the price-and-quality
equilibrium for two kinds of market games, namely a Stackelberg game, in which the in-
cumbent/leader chooses price and quality anticipating the reaction of the entrant/follower,
and a Nash-Cournot game, in which ﬁrms make choices simultaneously taking the rival’s
as given. In so doing, we account for the circumstance that the regulated ﬁrm may or
may not enjoy a strategic advantage vis-à-vis the unregulated entrant, depending upon
how competition, on one side, and regulation, on the other, aﬀect its market position and
commitment ability.8
5To mention only a few examples, data about TV channels (types of broadcast, audience shares),
advertising (spot duration, frequency) and programs (duration, content) are largely available. For instance,
in the UK, the Oﬃce of Communications (Ofcom) systematically circulates such data through surveys and
reviews (see also Carat [13] for information about EU countries). As for transport services, in the U.S., the
Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the Research and Innovative Technology Administration provides
detailed information about departure and arrival delays for a variety of transportation modes (aviation,
maritime, highway, transit, rail). Similarly, in France, the Observatoire des retards du transport aérien, as
managed by the Direction générale de l’aviation civile in cooperation with airlines and airports, collects and
publishes data on ﬂight punctuality. In Italy, the regulated rail company is currently compelled to disclose
information about delays at arrival. Furthermore, delays are being increasingly monitored by consumers’
associations and other concerned institutions (see, for instance, the report by Legambiente [26], based on
Censis data, about the situation of Italian railways commuter transport).
6We thank an Associate Editor for bringing this case to our attention.
7Within the domain of literature about mixed oligopolies, Bös [11] reaches the conclusion that a public
ﬁrm facing the requirement to operate at zero proﬁt should stick to a modiﬁed Ramsey-pricing rule.I nt u r n ,
exploring a homogeneous-product Stackelberg game with the public ﬁrm in the leader’s position, Beato
and Mas Colell [5] show that the solution to this game involves average-cost pricing for the public ﬁrm.
The latter anticipates the competitor’s policy choices, setting quantity so as to break even at equilibrium.
8On one hand, regulation may reinforce the commitment ability of the ﬁrm by limiting its operational
ﬂexibility. On the other hand, repeated revisions may progressively inhibit that ability. Subtle is the
relationship between the incumbent’s strategic behaviour and the regulator’s possibility to pursue diﬀerent
4Once we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Nash-Cournot equilibrium
that constitute the two possible regulatory targets, we demonstrate how each of them can
be decentralized by means of a properly structured price-and-quality cap targeted to the
sole incumbent. Importantly, it turns out that the optimal weights to be attached to the
latter’s price and quality, have exactly the same composition, whatever the benchmark.
These weights should be set, taking into account not only the market served by the in-
cumbent, but also the market(s) covered by the unregulated competitor(s). It further
emerges that, when the Stackelberg target is pursued, the unregulated market(s) should
also be considered in order to tighten/relax the global ceiling. These ﬁndings implicate
that, at the implementation stage, regulatory bodies of liberalized industries should not
be restricted to access or use of the information about the solely regulated ﬁrms. Rather,
they should be allowed to extract and make use of information about the overall industry.
This provides a neat argument against the enforcement of norms that prevent regulators
from basing their policies on information about unregulated markets and/or activities.
Still concerning implementation, we suggest that both the Stackelberg equilibrium and
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium be progressively approached by applying the regulatory
scheme iteratively over time, hinging on past data about market activities. We show that
when this strategy is indeed followed in either of the relevant frameworks, the quality-
adjusted price cap we propose exhibits the desirable property of being robust to small
errors in the practical determination of the weights to be attached to the regulated ﬁrm’s
price and quality.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
framework. In Section 3, we characterize the regulatory benchmarks, i.e., the equilibrium
price-and-quality pair of a Stackelberg and of a Nash-Cournot mixed duopoly. In Section
4, we show how either target can be decentralized by means of an appropriate price-
and-quality cap. In Section 5, we discuss the generality of our results and provide a few
concluding remarks. Most of the mathematical details are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an industry where two ﬁrms, namely an incumbent and an entrant, provide
vertically diﬀerentiated products. The incumbent, denoted as I, is subject to regulation.
The competitor, denoted as E, is not.
Firms’ strategic variables are price and quality (respectively, pk and qk,k= I,E). We
suppose that both operators choose their own price and quality simultaneously.9 Further,
we take price and quality to be observable and veriﬁable.
We explore two kinds of market game, namely the Stackelberg and the Nash-Cournot
game. In the former, ﬁrm I, the leader, anticipates the impact of its own price-and-
quality choice on the decision that ﬁrm E, the follower, will make. This framework closely
(more or less ambitious) targets. This opens delicate issues that would deserve speciﬁc attention but are
beyond the scope of the present work.
9See Section 5 for a discussion of the case in which ﬁrms choose quality before price.
5represents situations in which the incumbent of a previously fully regulated industry enjoys
a strategic advantage vis-à-vis the newcomer. In the Nash-Cournot game, each provider
chooses its own price and quality taking the competitor’s as given. This framework mirrors
contexts in which, unlike in the previous ones, the incumbent lacks commitment ability
vis-à-vis the unregulated competitor.
Thegoods that ﬁrms provide are perfect substitutes, except for the diﬀerence in quality.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation for quality, which is represented by a
parameter θ. More precisely, sticking to a quasi-linear framework, we assume that the net
surplus a consumer of characteristic θ derives from the consumption of x units of quality
q bought at unit price p is written10
vθ (x,p,q)=u(x) − (p − θq)x, (1)





,w i t hθ>θ≥ 0, and according to a continuous density function f (θ).
The associated cumulative distribution function is denoted as F (θ). Given her quality
valuation, a θ−consumer patronizing ﬁrm k ∈ {I,E} faces the so-called generalized price
e pk (θ) ≡ (pk − θqk), that is the unit price pk net of the beneﬁts θqk associated with
product quality. A θ-consumer prefers to purchase the good from ﬁrm k, rather than
from ﬁrm j 6= k ∈ {I,E}, whenever by doing so he/she bears a smaller generalized
price (e pk (θ) < e pj (θ)). Observe that, by construction, no consumer ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to
patronize both ﬁrms, as is usual in environments with vertical diﬀerentiation.
We suppose, without loss of generality, that ﬁrm k sells a product of higher quality at
ah i g h e rp r i c e( qk >q j,p k >p j). The marginal consumer, who is indiﬀerent between the





Thus, individuals whose θ exceeds θm patronize ﬁrm k, whereas individuals whose θ is
smaller than θm patronize ﬁrm j. We remove the possibility that some of the potential
consumers abstain from making any purchase, an unlikely case for some "basic" services
like telecommunications or daily transport services.
2.1 Consumer valuation of quality, demand and surplus




= e pk (θ), (3)
10In a more general formulation, one could allow the marginal valuation of quality to depend on the
quality level, namely θ(q). However, imposing the restriction that θ(q)=θ, ∀q, does not aﬀect the very
nature of results, as long as variations in the quality level do not yield signiﬁcant variations in the marginal
valuation of quality.
6where e pk (θ)=a r g m i n {e pI (θ), e pE (θ)}. Individual consumption xk (pk,q k;θ) appears to
be a function of the sole generalized price, e pk (θ), of the consumed commodity. As e pk (θ)
decreases with θ, and provided e pk (θm)=e pj (θm), the ranking of consumers in terms
of quality valuation is reﬂected in their ranking in terms of individual consumption xθ.
Formally, xθ1 ≤ xθ2 whenever θ1 ≤ θ2.
Relying upon (3), it is possible to establish the relationship between the impacts on
consumption of marginal changes in price and quality. To see this, observe ﬁrst that
(3) holds for any pk and qk. Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to pk and to qk and
combining the two equations, we obtain
∂xk/∂qk
−∂xk/∂pk
= θ, ∀k ∈ {I,E}. (4)
This evidences that, for the demand of a θ-consumer to remain unchanged as price pk is
increased by one unit, quality qk should be raised by an amount equal to the individual
marginal valuation for quality, namely θ. It also follows that a consumer with a strictly
higher quality valuation patronizing the same ﬁrm, would consider as strictly beneﬁcial
an increase in (pk,q k) that leaves a θ-consumer indiﬀerent. Conversely, a consumer with
a strictly lower valuation would ﬁnd it detrimental. Opposite appreciations would arise if
a decrease in (pk,q k) that leaves a θ-consumer indiﬀerent were considered.
Firms’ aggregate demands are immediately obtained by summing over the relevant
ranges of θ. Under the hypothesis that ﬁrm k serves high-valuation consumers and ﬁrm j








xk (pk,q k;θ)f (θ)dθ, (5b)
where p and q denote the vector of prices and qualities respectively. Demands display the
rather standard properties that we brieﬂy recall hereafter. For any k,j ∈ {I,E} :
1. (∂Xk/∂pk) < 0:demand for ﬁrm k0s product decreases with its own price pk;
2. (∂Xk/∂qk) > 0:demand for ﬁrm k0s product increases with its own quality qk;
3. (∂Xk/∂pj) > 0:demand for ﬁrm k0s product increases with the rival price pj;
4. (∂Xk/∂qj) < 0:demand for ﬁrm k0s product decreases with the rival quality qj.
It is also straightforward to obtain aggregate consumer surplus as a function of prices
and qualities. For this, we plug individual demands, as pinned down by (3), into the




vθ (xθ,p j,q j)f (θ)dθ +
Z θ
θm(p,q)
vθ (xθ,p k,q k)f (θ)dθ. (6)
72.2 Technologies and proﬁts
We denote as Ck (Xk,q k) the cost function of ﬁrm k ∈ {I,E}. This function is as-
sumed to be continuous and increasing in both production level and quality. In formal
terms (∂Ck/∂Xk) > 0 and (∂Ck/∂qk) > 0, all k ∈ {I,E}. We further assume that
lim
qk→+∞
Ck (Xk,q k)=+ ∞. This says that high quality products are so costly to improve
that perfect products (qk → +∞) are never actually oﬀered on the market. Finally, we as-
sume that the ﬁrms never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to decrease the quality of their products down
to zero. Taken together, these hypotheses ensure an interior solution to the determination
of quality. Firm k0sp r o ﬁt function is written
πk (p,q)=pkXk − Ck (Xk,q k), ∀k ∈ {I,E}. (7)
3 Characterization of the regulatory benchmark
As a ﬁrst step of the analysis, we need to characterize the (constrained) optimal price-
and-quality bundle, that the regulator should take as a target. This is the bundle that
would arise at the equilibrium of a mixed duopoly where, under a non-negative proﬁt
constraint, a welfare-maximizing (public) ﬁrm were to compete with a proﬁt-maximizing
(private) ﬁrm. We characterize this bundle in the two contexts of our interest, namely the
Stackelberg game and the Nash-Cournot game.
3.1 The proﬁt-maximizing (pE,q E)−pair
We begin by exploring the price-and-quality choice of the proﬁt-maximizing competi-
tor. In either game, ﬁrm E takes the price and quality of ﬁrm I as given, and optimizes
its own price and quality accordingly. Let εE ≡ (pE/XE)(−∂XE/∂pE) be (the absolute
value of) the demand elasticity with respect to its own price.
Lemma The price-and-quality bundle that maximizes πE (p,q) is characterized by the



















Equation (8) is the standard Lerner formula. It shows that ﬁrm E acts as a monopolist
vis-à-vis the "residual demand," XE. Moreover, according to Equation (9), quality qE is
chosen so that marginal returns from quality improvements (the left-hand side) equate
marginal costs (the right-hand side). The latter are expressed by the sum of the direct
costs of quality (the ﬁrst term) and its indirect costs (as reﬂected in the second term) that
follow from the demand increments induced by quality raise.









Interestingly, by analogy with Equation (4), the ratio in the left-hand side of (10) can
be interpreted as the aggregate marginal valuation of quality by ﬁrm E0s clients. In turn,
the right-hand side of (10) represents the average cost of a marginal increase in quality
for this same ﬁrm. Although ﬁrm E is a proﬁt maximizer, no distortion is introduced
by the choices it makes in terms of quality. Given consumer valuation, further quality
improvement would not appear to be worth its costs.11
3.2 The welfare-maximizing (pI,q I)-pair
We now move to characterize the regulatory target. Recall that this is the price-and-
quality bundle that ﬁrm I, the regulated incumbent, should implement so as to pursue
social interests without incurring budgetary losses. In formal terms, both in the Stack-
elberg and in the Nash-Cournot frameworks, the optimal (pI,q I)- p a i ri sp i n n e dd o w nb y
maximizing the social welfare function
W (p,q)=V (p,q)+πI (p,q)+πE (p,q) (11)
subject to the non-negative proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t
πI (p,q) ≥ 0, (12)
knowing that pE and qE obey the rules in (8) and (9).12 Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier













as the weighted average of quality valuations by the clients of ﬁrm k and j respectively.
Taking into account that the incumbent foresees the impact of its decisions on the entrant’s
decisions in the Stackelberg game, and that it behaves myopically in the Nash-Cournot
game, we can state the following proposition:13
11This does not mean that consumer and ﬁrm’s objectives are perfectly aligned, even when attention is
restricted to the quality dimension. In fact, were the price lower, the demand would be larger. As a result,
the average cost of quality would be smaller, calling for a strict improvement in terms of quality.
12Because the entrant is not subject to regulatory control, the regulator does not need to be concerned
with the ﬁnancial viability of ﬁrm E. Yet, as we assume that the regulated ﬁrm does face an unregulated
competitor, we implicitly take the entrant’s proﬁt to be non-negative at the incumbent’s welfare-maximizing
price and quality.
13See Appendix A.1.1 for mathematical details.
9Proposition 1 Under the Lemma, the incumbent’s price-and-quality bundle that max-
imizes (11) subject to (12) is characterized by the following pairs of conditions:

































































As the incumbent’s objective is to attain the highest feasible welfare level, both Equa-
tions (13) and (14) and Equations (15) and (16) embody the variations both in net con-
sumer surplus (V ) a n di nt h ec o m p e t i t o r ’ sp r o ﬁt (πE) that are induced respectively by a
raise in the price pI a n di nt h eq u a l i t yqI.
Speciﬁcally, in (13) and (15), the direct marginal impact on V of a raise in pI is






. The latter is the product of the competitor’s market size XE








Similarly, in (14) and (16), the direct marginal on V of a raise in qI is captured by the term






Again, the latter is the product of the competitor’s market size XE with a fraction equal







This proves the relevance of cross-price and cross-quality eﬀects (∂XE/∂pI and ∂XE/∂qI)
for the determination of the incumbent’s optimal price-and-quality pair.
Besides, in the Stackelberg game, strategic interactions across ﬁrms are accounted for.
In (13) and (14), they are captured by the terms (dpE/dpI), (dqE/dpI), (dpE/dqI) and
(dqE/dqI). The presence of these terms is due to the circumstance that variations in the
10price and quality of the market leader also aﬀect consumer utility through their impact on
the rival’s price and quality. This involves both a volume and a quality appreciation eﬀect.
The former is expressed by the follower’s demand, with which the terms under scrutiny
are systematically weighed. The latter is measured by the average valuation of quality by
the follower’s clients, with which the terms are also weighed whenever interactions with
quality qE are concerned. Of course, these terms do not appear in (15) and (16) because,
under Nash-Cournot competition, the incumbent does not anticipate the eﬀect of its own
decisions on the competitor’s decisions.
The apparent complexity of the conditions in Proposition 1, especially as far as the
Stackelberg setting is concerned, may induce one to consider the deﬁnition of the optimal
price and quality as a purely theoretical exercise, with no practical value. If the optimal
bundle does not ﬁnd an explicit expression, then exact implementation is indeed likely to
be beyond reach. This makes the results we present hereafter more striking.
4 Decentralization through a quality-adjusted price cap
In Proposition 1, we have identiﬁed the benchmark the regulator should eﬀect in the
marketplace. It is represented by (13) and (14) when ﬁrm I acts as a Stackelberg leader. It
is given by (15) and (16) when ﬁrm I plays àl aNash-Cournot. Decentralization requires
that the regulator adopt an appropriate policy device. For either setting, we hereafter
propose a quality-adjusted price-cap scheme that allows us to pursue the regulatory ob-
jective. To avoid redundancy, we content ourselves with presenting the (somewhat more
typical) situation in which, at the concerned target, the incumbent serves high-valuation
consumers and the competitor low-valuation consumers (i.e., we take k = I and j = E).
However, it is noteworthy that arguments carry over, mutatis mutandis, in the converse
case.14
4.1 The ideal quality-adjusted price cap
Suppose ﬁrst that the regulatory target is given by conditions (13) and (14). Assume
that the incumbent is left free to choose both price and quality, provided a price-and-
quality cap is satisﬁed. Formally, let ﬁrm I pin down the pair (pI,q I) that maximizes its
proﬁt πI (p,q) subject to the constraint
αpI − βqI ≤ P + γpE − δqE. (capS)
This is a modiﬁed (single-product) version of the standard quality-adjusted price cap
elaborated by De Fraja and Iozzi [19] for (multi-product) monopoly regulation. The
novelty is that it is extended to account for the strategic interactions that take place
between competitors in a Stackelberg game. As in the standard version, as long as α>0,
the regulatory constraint is tightened by an increase in price pI. With β>0, it is relaxed
14This case is formally treated in Appendix A.1.2.
11by an increase in quality qI. In addition, the right-hand side of the cap is designed to
explicitly embody the competitor’s choices. With γ<0, a raise in the rival price pE
tightens the constraint; with δ<0, a raise in the rival quality qE relaxes it.
When the regulatory target is given by (15) and (16), the extension terms in the right-
hand side of (capS) are unnecessary, provided that the incumbent behaves myopically.
Thus, in a Nash-Cournot duopoly, γ = δ =0and, despite the presence of a competitor,
the price cap comes back to the more standard quality-adjusted formulation
αpI − βqI ≤ P. (capN)
Let μ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with either (capS) or (capN). The following
proposition summarizes how the regulator should set the weights and the ceiling P for the


























































Pz is chosen so that πI
¡
pR,qR¢
=0 , ∀z ∈ {S,N}.
Proposition 2 tells that, for (capS) (resp. (capN)) to implement the optimal bundle
characterized by (13) and (14) (resp. (15) and (16)), it suﬃces (i) to set coeﬃcients as in
(aS) to (dS) (resp. (aN) and (bN)) and (ii) to decrease P enough to wash out the proﬁto f
ﬁrm I.The presence of the superscript R indicates that the exact values are those obtained
at the optimal price and quality, which are decentralized under the (partial) regulatory
regime.16
15See Appendix A.1.2 and A.2.2 for mathematical details.
16To save over notation, here and elsewhere in the text, we append the superscript R to denote the
optimal values, whatever the target they refer to. Remark, however, that this is not meant to suggest that
optimal values are the same in the diﬀerent cases.
12The ﬁrst, perhaps most striking, point to be made is that the optimal weights to be
attached to the incumbent’s price and quality are to be determined in the same way in the
Stackelberg and in the Nash-Cournot case ((aS) is analogous to (aN) and (bS) to (bN)).
According to (aS) and (aN), the appropriate weight for the incumbent’s price is given
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E, as multiplied by the coeﬃcient ν that reﬂects product diﬀeren-
tiation. Observe that, in general, ν is strictly smaller than one.17 Thus, ﬁrm I0s output
is given a larger relevance than ﬁrm E0s output in the composition of the price weight.
That is to say, the price weight α is obtained by subtracting from the regulated ﬁrm’s
quantity XR
I (the “standard” weight in cap formulae), a fraction of the quantity of the
(unregulated) competitor, νXR
E.
Similarly, the quality weight β, as deﬁned by (bS) and (bN), is given by the diﬀerence
between two terms. The ﬁrst term, e θ
R
I XR
I , is an aggregate measure of the quality appre-
ciation by ﬁrm I0s consumers. The second term is linked to the appreciation of quality by
ﬁrm E0sc o n s u m e r s .A st h es o l em a r g i n a lc l i e n t so fﬁrm E are concerned by changes in
qI, the quality appreciation refers to θR
m and not to e θ
R
E. Note that, if prices and qualities
are observable (as assumed), unlike e θ
R
E, the parameter θR
m can be easily computed. In-
terestingly enough, this marginal quality valuation is to be multiplied by νXR
E, the exact
same part of α that refers to ﬁrm E. The coeﬃcient is to be calculated by using the whole
demand for ﬁrm E0s product, XR
E (which is possibly observable), and not the consumption
by ﬁrm E0s marginal clients (which is not).
The downsizing of XR
E and θR
mXR
E in the expressions of α and β respectively, which
depends upon the coeﬃcient ν, relates to three elements. First, ceteris paribus,t h es m a l l e r






,t h el a r g e rν (and so the smaller α and
β). This suggests that less regulatory pressure needs to be exerted on ﬁrm I when prod-
ucts are not very diﬀerentiated. Indeed, in that case, the leader is disciplined by ﬁerce






, the weaker the
regulation. A similar argument applies here: having a large amount of individuals indiﬀer-
ent between operators signals that, given prices and qualities, products are almost "perfect










f (θ)dθ, the higher ν, meaning that a relatively soft regulation is
required when the entrant has market power.
All in all, a clear message can be drawn by looking at the optimal values of α and β
characterized in Proposition 2. First of all, neither in the Stackelberg nor in the Nash-
Cournot case, can the regulator neglect the presence of the competitor to properly regulate
the incumbent. Second, the larger the market share of the unregulated ﬁrm, the lower
17As from the deﬁnition in Proposition 2, and from Appendix A.1.2, the coeﬃcient ν is the ratio between
the marginal variation in X
R
F i n d u c e db ya ni n c r e a s ei npL and the (absolute value of the) overall (marginal
and inframarginal) variation in the same quantity X
R
F as induced by an increase in pF. In general, the
r a t i oi ss t r i c t l ys m a l l e rt h a n1, because the (cross) eﬀect of price pL on the entrant’s demand is lower than
the (own) eﬀect of price pF. Its speciﬁcm a g n i t u d ed e p e n d so nt h ed i ﬀerence between cross and own-price
eﬀects. The sole case in which ν equals 1, is the unit demand case, as mentioned later in the text.




, the optimal weight attached to price pI in the price-cap formula
can be rewritten as α =
£
XR − (1 + ν)XR
E
¤
.A sν>0, this also means that competition
has a bigger impact on markets than it appears, when considering the sole market share





. This further evidences an important feature of our cap:
it accounts for (and adapts to) the transition from regulated monopolies to increasingly
more competitive markets.
From Proposition 2, it also emerges that when the regulator points to the Stackelberg
benchmark, the magnitude of the competitive eﬀect and the relevance of the competitor’s
product quality for consumers should be considered not only to ﬁx the weights of the
regulated price and quality, but also to tighten/relax the overall ceiling. Recall, indeed,
from (capS) that in the Stackelberg context, the regulatory constraint is relaxed by a
decrease in the entrant’s price pE a n db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee n t r a n t ’ sq u a l i t yqE. According





,t h em o r ear a i s ei npE tightens the cap.
As prices are strategic complements, an increase in pI would also trigger an increase in pE.
The larger XR
E, the greater the negative impact on total welfare. On the other hand, (dS)




t h em o r ear a i s ei nqE relaxes the cap. As qualities are strategic substitutes, a decrease
in qI would trigger an increase in qE. The larger (e θ
R
EXR
E), the greater the beneﬁts from a
raise in qE against a reduction in qI.
The predictions of our analysis conﬁrm Brennan [12]’s intuition that, in the presence
of competitors endowed with market power, a cap on the incumbent’s price cannot be
optimally calibrated on the sole incumbent’s output. Indeed, unlike in the presence of a
passive fringe, the marginal welfare eﬀect of a price variation is aﬀected by the competitors’
output. Actually, Proposition 2 formalizes Brennan [12]’s conclusion for price-cap regu-
lation of the incumbent in Stackelberg and Nash-Cournot oligopolies. Besides, it extends
that conclusion to environments where not only price but also quality is regulated.
A peculiar case arises when customers allocate a single consumption unit to their
preferred operator.18 The peculiarity is that, ν being exactly equal to 1, the Nash-Cournot
target can be pursued by simply adopting a "standard" quality-adjusted price-cap. The
latter is a cap of the form (pI − e θ
R
I qI) ≤ p, in which the incumbent’s price is replaced
by its consumers’ generalized price. This recipe is equally suitable for decentralization of
the Stackelberg target, provided that the incumbent’s decisions have no impact on the
entrant’s quality choice.19 The striking aspect is that the optimal policy does account
for the impact of regulation on the whole industry and, yet, the regulatory target can be
18Examples of unit demand can be found in commuter transport. A commuter allocates his/her con-
sumption unit (i.e., the trip to be made daily to reach the workplace) to the transport mode that makes
him/her best oﬀ among all available alternatives. Note also that a quality attribute like travel time is both
observable and veriﬁable, hence it can be used for regulatory purposes.
19This could be the case in environments where unregulated operators oﬀer some minimum quality level
that does not react to variations in the incumbent’s price and quality, say, because they obey some given
standard or for technological reasons. See Appendix A.1.4, for mathematical details on the unit-demand
case in the Stackelberg framework.
14enforced by looking at the incumbent only. Despite what this result holds for very speciﬁc
environments, it may prove important for regulatory practice if, in such environments,
relevant markets are diﬃcult to deﬁne.
4.2 Implementation and robustness issues
At the implementation stage, the ﬁrst concern of the regulator is to identify the target
that it is possible to pursue, that, in turn, dictates which policy is to be adopted. Actually,
this depends upon the incumbent’s strategic behaviour. The target is represented by (13)
and (14) when ﬁrm I acts as a Stackelberg leader, in which case (capS) is to be adopted.
The target is given by (15) and (16) when ﬁrm I plays àl aNash-Cournot, in which case
(capN) is the appropriate policy.
From a social perspective, the Nash-Cournot target is less desirable than the Stackel-
berg target in that it embodies less information about ﬁrms’ reactions. Yet, it is the target
that is feasible whenever the regulated ﬁrm is not in a position to move ﬁrst and/or to
commit in the market game. This shows that the incumbent’s strategic position aﬀects the
regulator’s capability to pursue more or less ambitious objectives. Observe, however, that
regulation itself may have an impact on the incumbent’s strategic position. On one hand,
imposing repeated regulatory revisions on the incumbent may progressively remove its
strategic advantage. Conversely, by reducing the operational ﬂexibility of the incumbent,
regulation may preserve and perpetuate its commitment ability.
Actually, the intertemporal impact of regulation is not a minor aspect because, in the
same vein as in Vogelsang and Finsinger [33], De Fraja and Iozzi [19], Billette de Villemeur




be approached through an iterative process. More precisely, as for a
"standard" price cap, information on past market performance can be used to update the
weights in the constraint at each step. In addition, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be progressively
reduced by adjusting P until πI =0 . It is worth mentioning that both in the Stackelberg
and in the Nash-Cournot cases, our regulatory scheme exhibits the following robustness
property.21
Proposition 3 Let WS (resp. WN) be the welfare level that is achieved under (capS)
(resp. (capN))w h e nP is set such that πI (p,q)=0 . Around the optimal values charac-






=0 , ∀z ∈ {S,N}.
20The works of Vogelsang and Finsinger [33], De Fraja and Iozzi [19] and Billette de Villemeur [8] belong
to the wide family of papers that elaborate converging schemes of price regulation under monopoly. Billette
de Villemeur and Vinella [10] propose a converging scheme of partial quantity regulation under Cournot
(quantity) competition.
21See Appendix A.1.3 and A.2.3 for mathematical details.
15According to Proposition 3, variations in the price weight and in the quality weight
around their optimal values, have no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on welfare. This means that the
scheme is robust to the possibility that the regulator would be unable to set α and β
exactly as dictated in Proposition 2. In other words, the proper functioning of the scheme
would not be undermined, should small biases appear in the weight determination. This
result should reassure practitioners who might object that it would be problematic to




m) and the degree of competition are concerned.
However, this last preoccupation is especially weak in the unit demand cases in which
the regulator needs to determine the sole quality weight e θ
R
I . Actually, in these cases, the
incentive scheme reduces to a single parameter, to be exogenously set. If quality is to be
considered by the regulator, then this parameter is the simplest information one can think
of. Indeed, it is an average marginal valuation of quality by the incumbent’s consumers,
upon which the regulator may legitimately and more easily collect data.22 Thus, along the
current practice, we suggest that the regulator estimate the social valuation of quality and
use this estimate as an attribute in the implementation scheme.23 With a quality value
that is ﬁxed and publicly available, the scheme would be transparent and little prone to
manipulations, hence more likely to attract public consensus.
5 Concluding remarks
There are essentially two insights to be drawn from our analysis.
First, in a partially regulated oligopoly, the regulatory agency should be able to hinge
upon information for the whole industry. In general, information about the sole regulated
ﬁrm does not appear to allow for eﬃcient regulation. In the price-and-quality cap we
have looked at, appropriate weights depend on the (optimal) quantities provided by both
the regulated incumbent and the entrant, despite the fact that the latter is not directly
concerned by regulation. These results hold true whether ﬁrms compete àl aStackelberg
or àl aNash-Cournot.
Second, under both kinds of competition, price-and-quality cap regulation is robust
to small errors in the determination of the weights to be attached to the regulated ﬁrm’s
decision variables. It thus appears reasonable to hinge upon such regulatory mechanisms to
account for the quality dimensions of the products sold in vertically diﬀerentiated markets,
despite the fact that they may rely upon (possibly imperfect) statistical estimates.
We have considered settings in which quality is as ﬂexible as price. However, for some
22For instance, stated preferences can be (and are indeed largely) used to form time value estimates in
passenger transport sectors.
23This is in contrast to the implementation scheme proposed by De Fraja and Iozzi [19] for monopoly
regulation, in which quality valuation is endogenously determined by computing at each step consumer
marginal surplus (∂V/∂q). In the multi-product environment the authors explore, this creates a problem
in terms of convergence of the regulatory algorithm to the second-best monopoly prices and qualities. This
problem is circumvented by introducing an additional constraint that further limits the regulated ﬁrm’s
choices.
16quality dimensions, adjustments can take longer than for price. It is reasonable to think
that in liberalized markets in which this occurs, incumbents will still enjoy a strategic
advantage in quality setting vis-à-vis new competitors. By contrast, this advantage is
less likely to survive in price setting. Such situations can be represented by a three-stage
game in which a sequential quality choice by the incumbent and then by the entrant is
followed by (simultaneous) price competition.24 In this game, unlike in the Stackelberg
context, the entrant anticipates the impact its quality decision will have on both its own
and the incumbent’s price.25 For this reason, the regulatory target diﬀers from those we
have presented.26 One might thus expect a diﬀerent regulatory policy to be required for
its decentralization. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that both the structure
of the regulatory constraint and the optimal composition of the weights exactly replicate
those of the Stackelberg context. Moreover, the scheme maintains the same robustness
property at the implementation stage. This points to the conclusion that the regulatory
recipe we provide, although far from general, applies to a larger variety of situations than
our approach might seem to suggest at ﬁrst.
Nonetheless, there still is a long way to go for a full understanding of price-and-
quality regulation of vertically diﬀerentiated oligopolies. Our study represents an initial
undertaking in that direction. Because our goal was to pinpoint how competition with
a strategic entrant aﬀects the incumbent’s regulation, we have found it useful to look
at single-product ﬁrms as a ﬁrst step. However, regulated utilities often provide several
goods/services. To account for this circumstance, the analysis should be extended to
the case of multi-product ﬁrms, which has been addressed only for monopolies so far.
Moreover, we have taken ﬁrms to behave non-cooperatively. In practice, they might have
an incentive to collude so as to undo the regulatory policy. That asymmetrically regulated
ﬁrms can proﬁtably coordinate against the regulator is shown by Aubert and Pouyet [4]
in Bayesian environments with adverse selection. It would thus be interesting to study
the ideal price-and-quality cap with regard to collusive settings. This is left for further
research.
24We are thankful to the associate editor for suggesting to us to consider this setup.
25When quality is a longer-run decision variable, as compared to price, it represents the very strategic
instrument for ﬁrms. This is the situation Grilo [21] and Cremer, De Rycke and Grimaud [15] represent in
their mixed oligopoly models. However, these models diﬀer from the three-stage game we refer to in that
the public ﬁrm is taken to have no strategic advantage over the private ﬁrm. Competitors play a two-stage
game, in which they set qualities anticipating the impact their choices will have on prices. In Grilo [21],
it emerges that ﬁrst best is viable in mixed duopolies, whereas it is not in private regulated duopolies,
because public managers are better informed than regulators. First best outcomes also emerge in Cremer,
De Rycke and Grimaud [15] as long as the budget constraint of the public ﬁrm does not bind. Otherwise,
a second-best outcome arises, which is still preferable to the outcome that a private duopoly would yield.
By contrast, in the partial regulatory setting we have considered, the ﬁrst-best outcome is beyond reach
even without budget requirements and under "perfect" regulation.
26More precisely, although the competitors’ pricing rules are the same as in the Cournot framework,
the rules that characterize the competitors’ qualities diﬀers from both the Cournot and the Stackelberg
counterparts. See Appendix B for mathematical details about the three-stage game described in the text.
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19A The Stackelberg and the Nash-Cournot framework
As a ﬁrst step, we propose the formal analysis for the Stackelberg framework. After
characterizing the price-and-quality bundle of ﬁrm I (the regulatory target), we derive the
optimal weights in the price-and-quality cap, describing both the case in which pI >p E and
qI >q E a n dt h a ti nw h i c hpI <p E and qI <q E. This allows us to clarify that analogous
conclusions are reached, mutatis mutandis, in either case. Thus, to avoid redundancy, we
thereafter focus on the former case only. We further show that the scheme is robust to
imperfections in the determination of the price and quality weight.
As a second step, we repropose the analysis for the Nash-Cournot framework, taking
pI >p E and qI >q E for the reason previously illustrated.
A.1 The Stackelberg framework
A.1.1 The regulatory benchmark






























































xE (pE,q E;θ)θf (θ)dθ = e θEXE. (19d)
























xE (pE,q E;θ)θf (θ)dθ = e θEXE.












Plugging (19a), (19b) and (19d) into (18) and then (20) and (18) into (17), we obtain (13).
















A similar analysis yields the following decomposition of the variation in consumer surplus
dV
dqI
















Replacing (22) and (23) into (21), we ultimately obtain (14).
A.1.2 The ideal price-and-quality cap

































reﬂect only marginal variations, as ﬁrm E0s
inframarginal customers are not concerned by changes in pI and qI. The other weights in
Proposition 2 follow straightforwardly.








































































































































































































































































































































which expression do not diﬀer from the one obtained in the case pI >p E and qI >q E.
A.1.3 Robustness of the scheme
Let us focus on the case of pI >p E and qI >q E. As πR












































































































































































Imperfections in α With πR



















dα . The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to pI










































































Plug this into (32) and use (27a) and (27b) to obtain dWR
dα =0 .
Imperfections in β With πR








































24A.1.4 The case of unit demand








































m)dθ, the regulatory constraint becomes
e pIXR









When the incumbent’s choices have no impact on qE, this reduces to (pI −e θ
R
I qI) ≤ p.
A.2 The Nash-Cournot framework
A.2.1 The regulatory benchmark





























A.2.2 The ideal price-and-quality cap
The price-and-quality constraint reduces to
αpI − βqI ≤ P. (cap-N)













where the superscript N is appended to indicate the Nash game. The optimal quality
weight is still given by





















25A.2.3 Robustness of the scheme
Still focusing on the case of pI >p E and qI >q E and omitting superscripts for sake of

















































































































dα . For the optimal values (alpha-N)


















Plugging this into the expression for dW
dα at the optimal values, we still have dW R
dα =0 .















into the expression for dW
dβ , we still obtain dW R
dβ =0 .
26B Quality as a longer-run choice variable
We hereafter propose the formal analysis for the situation in which quality is a longer-
run choice variable, as compared to price. We ﬁrst solve a three-stage game in which a
sequential quality choice is followed by a simultaneous price choice, in order to characterize
the regulatory target. We then proceed as in Appendix A with pI >p E and qI >q E.
B.1 The regulatory benchmark
The game unfolds as follows. At stage 1 ﬁrm I chooses qI. At stage 2 ﬁrm E chooses
qE. At stage 3 ﬁrm I and ﬁrm E choose pI and pE respectively. We solve the game
backward taking into account that, all over the game, ﬁrm I faces the constraint πI ≥ 0
with multiplier λ.











where a star is appended to indicate previous choices. The ﬁrst-order condition with





































I) − CE(XE(pE,p I;qE,q∗
I),q∗
E).
Firm E anticipates that the choice of qE will aﬀect the choice of pE and pI at stage 3. The










































At stage 1, ﬁrm I chooses qI facing the objective function
W (pI,p E;qI,q E)=V (pI,p E;qI,q E)+πI (pI,p E;qI,q E)+πE (pE,p I;qE,q I).
Firm I anticipates that the choice of qI will have (a) a direct impact on the choice of qE
at stage 2, (b) a direct impact on the choice of pE and pI at stage 3, (c) an indirect impact
on the choice of pE and pI at stage 3 through the impact on the choice of qE at stage 2.
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Overall, the regulatory target is given by the pair of conditions (37) and (41).
B.2 The ideal price-and-quality cap
Let the constraint
αpI − βqI ≤ P + γpE − δqE, (cap-III)
Firm I maximizes πI subject to (cap-III). The Lagrangian is written
  = πI + μ(P + γpE − δqE − αpI + βqI),























































where the superscript III is appended to indicate the optimal values of the weights and
the ceiling in the three-stage game.
B.3 Robustness of the scheme









































































































































































































































29B.3.1 Imperfections in α




















































































Replacing this, we have dWR
dα =0 .
B.3.2 Imperfections in β





















































































Replacing this, we have dWR
dβ =0 .
30